Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 6

1940

SALES - RECOVERY BY SELLER AGAINST THIRD PARTY
TORTFEASOR
Robert A. Solomon
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert A. Solomon, SALES - RECOVERY BY SELLER AGAINST THIRD PARTY TORTFEASOR, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 923 (1940).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss6/23

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

SALES -

RECOVERY BY SELLER AGAINST THIRD

p ARTY TORTFEASOR -

Plaintiff sold a truck under a conditional sales contract expressly reserving title
until the purchase price was paid by the buyer. Pursuant to the terms of the
contract, possession was transferred to the latter. While the truck was in his
possession it was destroyed through the negligence of the defendant, a third
party. At the time of the destruction the buyer had not defaulted in the payments. Held, affirming the decision of the lower court, that the plaintiff had no
right to maintain an action against the defendant to recover for the negligent
destruction of the truck. Gas City Transfer Co. v. Miller, (Ind. App. 1939)
21 N. E. (2d) 428.
A third party who negligently destroys a chattel which is the subject m::itter
of a conditional sales contract must respond in damages to the extent of the
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injury to the chattel.1 The only question involved in the principal case, and
similar cases involving the destruction of chattels subject to a conditional sales
agreement, is as to the one who should be entitled to maintain an action against
the third party. The general rule is that both the seller and the buyer can maintain an action. 2 The seller's recovery is limit_ed to the unpaid balance.8 However,
the buyer can recover the entire amount,4 but such a recovery will bar the
seller from recovering against the third party.5 Frequently the buyer's right to
recover the entire amount is compared to a bailee's right.6 A bailee may recover
the full value if the bailed goods are destroyed by the negligence of a third party.1
However a sounder basis exists for· sustaining a buyer's recovery. Since the buyer
under a conditional sales contract by the majority view is liable for the purchase
price of the chattels in spite of their loss or destruction without fault on his
part,8 it would seem that, at least in these jurisdictions, the buyer should be
allowed to recover the full value in order to protect his liability for the unpaid
purchase price, even though he may hold the surplus in trust for the seller.9
In jurisdictions where the buyer is discharged from his obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price when the goods are destroyed through no fault of
his,1° a court logically might hold that the buyer's recovery is limited to the
damages to his special possessory interest provided that the damages exceeded the
unpaid balance.11 According to the overwhelming weight of authority, the
seller's right to maintain an action, even before default, against a third person
WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 333 (1924).
38 A. L. R. 1337 (1925).
8 Of course, the seller's recovery .can never exceed the value of the chattel. Rentz
v. Huckabee Auto Co., 53 Ga. App. 329, 185 S. E. 575 (1936).
4 First Nat. Bank v. Union Ry., 153 Tenn. 386, 284 S. W. 363 (1926); Lacey
v. Great Northern Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924); Helf v. Harsen & Keller
Truck Co., 167 Wash. 206, 6 P. (2d) IIO (1932).
5 Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio R. R. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn.
354, 170 S. W. 591 (1914). Even a settlement by the buyer with the third party
tortfeasor will normally bar a suit by the seller, but if there was evidence of fraud or
bad faith, the seller could probably have it set aside. Harris v. Seabord Air Line Ry.,
190 N. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319 (1925). But at least one other court has held that
such a settlement does not bar the seller from maintaining his action unless he authorizes it. Lacey v. Great Northern Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225 P. 808 (1924). In view of
the possibility of bad faith, this latter view has merit.
6 Stotts v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 94 Wash. 339, 162 P.
519 (1917).
7 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 90 (1936).
8 38 A. L. R. 1319 (1925); WAITE, SALES, 2d ed., 48-51 (1938).
9 Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717. (1895).
10 Authorities cited supra, note 8. In a very real sense there is no majority or
minority view because the real question is merely one of consideration, that is, did the
seller promise merely to transfer possession or both title and possession?
11 Logically, if the buyer is not liable to the seller, the latter should not be
allowed an action which belongs to another person, especially since a, settlement or
action may be detrimental to the seller's interest. WALSH, PROPERTY, 2d ed., 107-108
(1927), makes a similar argument in respect to a bailee's action. He'says when the
bailor is not liable to the bailee there is no justificati9n for allowing him to recover
damages to the bailee's interest.
1 I
2

19401

RECENT DECISIONS

-who negligently destroys the goods rests upon his legal title to the goods injured or destroyed.12 There is no doubt but that general property title and
possessory interests may be separated,18 and that the general property interest
of the seller should be sufficient to sustain his action. That the seller's recovery.
is predicated upon a separate legal interest is shown by the decisions which hold
that the contributory negligence of the buyer does not bar the seller's action 14
and by the fact that his recovery is limited to the unpaid purchase price. 15 The
court in the instant case broke away from this well established rule of law and
held that, prior to the default, only the buyer was entitled to maintain an action
against the third person. To substantiate its decision the court relies upon an
Alabama case 16 and a quotation from Corpus Juris. 11 Neither, when carefully
analyzed, is authority for the rule of law laid down.18 The court proceeded
upon the assumption that the seller's action must be based upon possession, and
since prior to default all possessory rights are vested in the buyer he is the only
one entitled to maintain the action. But as pointed out above, the basis of the
seller's rights is not an alleged right to possession, but rather his general property
interest in the chattel, often referred to as title.19 The court should remember
that the purpose of a conditional sales contract is to reserve legal title in the
seller as security for the payment of the purchase price. It would seem only
reasonable that if a third person impinges upon this interest this should give
rise to a cause of action in his favor and if the chattel is destroyed the
12 38 A. L. R. 1337 (1925). For more recent cases, see Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Satterthwaite, 107 N. J. L. 17, 150 A. 235 (1930); First Nat. Bank v. Union
Ry., 153 Tenn. 386, 284 S. W. 363 (1926).
18 Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn. & Cress. 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (1827).
14 Sea Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., (C. C. A. 5th, 1908) 159 F. 676;
Lacey v. Great Northern Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 225.P. 808 (1924).
15 Supra, note 3.
16 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Miller, 209 Ala. 378, 96 So. 322 (1923).
17 55 C. J. 1312 (1931).
18 In Louisville & N. R. R. v. Miller, 209 Ala. 378, 96 So. 322 (1923), the
action before the court was trespass. A trespass action is based solely upon possession
and of course the seller could not maintain such an action because all possessory rights
prior to default are vested in the buyer. If the decision can be so construed as to
prevent even a trespass on the case action, a very peculiar result would be reached.
Alabama is one of the minority jurisdictions which holds that the buyer under a
conditional sales contract is discharged from further payments when the goods are
destroyed without fault on his part. Hence there would ordinarily be no incentive for
the buyer to sue, and the seller would be remediless. When this is considered it seems
probable that the Alabama decision should be explained away upon a pleading point.
None of the cases cited in 55 C, J. 1312 (1931) directly establishes the point
that a seller cannot, prior to default, maintain an action against a third party who
negligently destroys the chattels. Conversion and possessory actions by the seller must
be distinguished.
19 Nowhere in its decision did the court mention the general property interest
of the seller. By innuendo it might be argued that the court really intended to say
that, until default, the seller does not possess legal title, but only a lien interest which
is not sufficient to support an action. But, even though this position would be logicaly
sound, there is absolutely no authority for this proposition.
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seller should be allowed- to recover to the extent of his loss.20 Under the
rule promulgated in the principal case the vendor has lost his security without any rights arising as a consequence of the destruction. If the buyer sues
and recovers, in essence the seller becomes nothing more than a general creditor, 21 and if the buyer defaulted, but refused to sue the third party, the seller
would be remediless. 22 Likewise if the buyer were guilty of contributory negligence, apparently under this rule neither the buyer nor the seller could maintain
an action. 28 Even though the buyer is still liable for the unpaid purchase price,24
these practical considerations militate against the wisdom of the rule. It is
believed that the decision violates the fundamental princ_iple of law that the
holder of legal title is entitled to be protected against unlawful interferences
by third parties and is directly contrary to the whole concept of conditional
sales contracts.
Robert A. Solomon

20 Almost without exception other courts follow this view. Certainly it is more
in keeping 'with the nature of a conditionhl sales agreement.
21 Such a result seems inescapable. Since the seller has no right to sue, the amount
recovered would be in the buyer's own right and would belong solely to him. Thus
in case the buyer were insolvent, even though he had recovered from the third party,
the seller would be forced to share pro rata with the other creditors.
22 Conceivably the court might make an exception in the case where the buyer
refused to sue, but there is no mention of such an exception in the decision.
28 According to some authorities, this result would be proper, but so long as there
are separate interests involved and separate rights arising from those interests, the
negligence of one party should not be imputed to the other party so as to defeat
recovery.
2 ~ In its decision the court stressed this point.

